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A Biannual Journal
Vol. 6, No. 1, January 2005
Book Review
Freedom Evolves, by Daniel C. Dennett. New York: Viking, 2003, 347 pp., Index & Bibliography.
ISBN: 0-670-03186-0. 
Freedom Evolves draws together themes from much of Daniel Dennett’s pervious work. It aims to
support and extend the compatiblist account of free will he set out in Elbow Room (1984), now that he
has fulfilled that book’s promissory notes with Consciousness Explained (1991a) and Darwin’s
Dangerous Idea (1995). In the first third of the new book Dennett develops compatibalist accounts of his
key concepts by extending the analysis of non-human agents presented in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. The
remainder of Freedom Evolves is an attempt to show that if concepts like determinism and freedom are
conceived as suggested, conscious free will and moral responsibility turn out to be natural phenomena;
like all the other traits that make humans distinct, they are the products of multiple levels and kinds of
natural selection. One consequence of the debt that this book bears to its predecessors is that those
familiar with Dennett’s corpus will find fewer new ideas in this book than in the major texts that
preceded it. That said, even for philosophical foes, Freedom Evolves is a rewarding text, full of
fascinating stories and the usual sparkling wit.
Dennett’s compatibilism assumes that randomness is irrelevant to the sort of freedom we hope we
have. In a deterministic or indeterministic world, what we want, when we say “I want to be free” or
“I want to have free choice” is to be able to use information to best achieve our goals. We expect
that in otherwise identical external circumstances, one agent can act differently from another, and in
so doing demonstrate a degree of autonomy, a certain freedom. Dennett describes those able to act
in ways that overcome hindrances as having “evitable” relations to these obstacles (2003: 56).
Death, in a given situation, may be inevitable for one but evitable for another because the latter can
extract more information from the same patterns, or respond to the same information in a different
way. Such differences in outcome only require there be physical difference between token agents to
realize the differences in cognitive and physical capacities.
In the book’s final chapter, Dennett (2003: 302) endorses Nicholas Maxwell’s (1984) definition of
freedom as “the capacity to achieve what is of value in a range of circumstances”. On this
conception, all species enjoy a modicum of freedom. Freedom, thus conceived, is compatible with
every action of every animal being fully determined by its past physical states, along with its
current environment. We are no exception. What sets us apart from other animals is not that we can
escape determinism but that we can invent new means to old ends and, most important of all, alter
and augment the ends our genes endow us with. Some other animals can learn to seek their ends in
new ways, but our unique intellectual and social skills ensure that our capacity to do so vastly
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outstrips that of all other animals. Unlike any other animal though, we are also able to reflect on
what our values should be. As a result, we can both extend the range of what is evitable for us and,
sometimes, alter our values in light of what we have discovered to be inevitable.
This facility to alter our selves and thus change our nature is, Dennett claims, all the freedom we
should want, once we understand the confusion motivating our fear that real freedom is
incompatible with determinism.
To say that if determinism is true, your future is fixed, is to say… nothing interesting.
To say that if determinism is true, your nature is fixed is to say something false. … It is
the confusion between having a fixed nature and a fixed future that motivates the anguish
over determinism. The confusion arises when one tries to maintain two perspectives on
the same universe at once: the “God’s eye” perspective that sees past and future… and
the engaged perspective of an agent within the universe (2003: 93 italics original).
The problem, of course, is that we have good reason for wanting to maintain both perspectives
simultaneously. We want them to be compatible because we fear that whatever does not fit into the
“God’s eye” view is not really real, or at the very least, cannot be studied objectively. Reductive
explanations work by showing us that our initial, parochial, agent-centered “folk” conception of a
property can be replaced by a conception that is independent of our particular viewpoint. Heat, to
take everyone’s favorite example, is to be understood in terms of radiation and molecular motion,
not the sensation of warmth. Dennett’s challenge is to reduce human freedom to a highly evolved
form of evitablity without appearing guilty of playing bait and switch. He has to show his
alternative conception of freedom has enough of the properties traditionally attributed to freedom to
warrant using the same term for both concepts. In particular, he has to show that, applied to
humans, his conception of freedom suffices to warrant talk of blame, praise and moral evaluation in
general. If not enough of the old concept is retained, his critics can complain that, as with the
demise of “Phlogiston” and the rise of “Oxygen”, the reconceptualization is so deep that a new term
is required to avoid confusion. If, despite his best efforts, you remain wedded to traditional
conceptions of freedom and free will, you may conclude that rather than explaining how such
properties can exist in the natural world, Dennett’s analysis shows them to be fictions.
Dennett is often accused of denying the very existence his objects of interest (e.g. Wright 2000: 398
in Dennett 2003: 223). From his days as W. V. Quine’s student at Harvard and then Gilbert Ryle’s
student at Oxford, Dennett’s rhetoric has given his readers ample textual evidence for such
indictments. His rhetoric should, however, be read in light of his longstanding efforts to undermine
traditional conceptions of it takes for a property to be real (e.g. Dennett 1987, 1991B). Dennett
follows his teachers’ intuitions on this matter, above all else. Epistemology determines ontology. A
property is real if, by positing its existence, we can more accurately predict the behavior of the
system possessing the property. Thus, Dennett (1987) argues, all there is to having beliefs and
desires is being the sort of system whose behavior is best predicted by taking the “intentional
stance” towards it by considering it as an agent with intentional states. Notoriously, this allows for
the attribution of (non-conscious) beliefs and desires to thermostats and bacteria. In defending such
ascriptions Dennett asks, if there is no additional predictive or explanatory value, why should we
commit ourselves to the ontological extravagance of supposing that basic intentionality involves
anything more than such systems can provide? Dennett peruses similar reductive strategies with
consciousness and free will. In all three cases he claims that rather than showing us that the
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property in question is not real, the reduction properly identifies what we have been talking about
all along. Intentionality, consciousness and freewill are something other than what our personal
acquaintance with them has led us to believe, but they are nonetheless “real” – in the only sense
that matters.
Dennett’s early critics often charged him with throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Since the
early 90’s Dennett has sought to address his critics dialogically, in conversation with a fictionalized
skeptic. Freedom Evolves is no exception. In this case, in addition to his responses to “Conrad‘s”
complaints, we also have a lengthy and very telling commentary on Daniel Wegner’s The Illusion of
Conscious Will (2002). Dennett praises Wegner’s book as “the best I have seen” on the subject and
admits he “agrees with it in almost every regard”. The exception is for the title, along with the
rhetorical strategy that lies behind it.
Wegner and I agree on the bottom line; what we disagree on is tactics. Wenger thinks it
is less misleading, more effective, to say that conscious will is an illusion, but a benign
illusion… . I myself think that the temptation to misread this conclusion… is so strong
that I prefer to make the same points by saying that no, free will is not an illusion; all
the varieties of free will worth wanting are, or can be, ours – but you have to give up a
bit of false and outdated ideology to understand how this can be so (2003: 224, italics in
original).
The ideology we are asked to abandon is a view of the mind founded on what Dennett calls “the
Cartesian theater”, the assumption that there is a point in the mind where it all comes together and
decisions get made. If we jettison this assumption, replace it with his “pandemonium” model of
consciousness, and employ a conception of freedom based on evitablity, Dennett promises us an
account of free will compatible with determinism and sufficient for moral judgment.
The pandemonium model spreads the work of consciousness out over space and time, as various
bits of mental content vie for each other’s attention. When one wins out by determining the course
of your behavior, you become conscious of its content because determination of your behavior is
what makes bits of content conscious. “Mental contents become conscious not by entering some
special chamber in the brain… but by winning the competition against other mental contents for
domination in the control of behavior, and hence for achieving long-lasting effects – or as we
misleadingly say, ‘entering into memory’” (2003: 254). The processes that lead to a decision are
thus taken non-consciously in the unfelt competition between bits of content. It may seem that the
model only allows us to become conscious of our decisions after the process of selection is
complete. This is certainly the view of most of the neuroscientists Dennett discusses. Dennett
shows, however, that their data leaves open a number of options where free will could play
something like its traditional role (2003: 232-38). Ultimately though, all attempts to place decisions
and our consciousness of them on a time line are seen by Dennett to be answers to ill posed
questions.
The questions are ill-posed because they depend on assumptions that you are distinct from your
non-conscious information processing. Dennett believes that if we pay proper consideration to how
thoroughly work is temporally and spatially distributed across the brain we will realize that you, and
thus your will, are more than your immediate consciousness.
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Our free will, like all our other mental powers, has to be smeared out over time, not
measured at instants. Once you distribute the work… in both space and time in the brain,
you have to distribute the moral agency as well. You are not out of the loop; you are the
loop. … You are not an extensionless point. What you do and what you are incorporates
all these things that happen and is not something separate from them. Once you can see
yourself from that perspective, you can dismiss the heretofore compelling concept of a
mental activity that is unconsciously begun and then only later “enters consciousness”.
This is an illusion since many of the reactions you have to that mental activity are
initiated at the earlier time (2003: 242, italics in original).
The hope is that the further we move from viewing consciousness as the point towards which all
sensory input flows and from which willful conscious action emanates, the closer we come to
seeing that we are in control after all – though we are not what we thought we were. We lack, for
example, the unity afforded by the Cartesian point.1 While seeing oneself in the extended form that
Dennett suggests justifies the claim that you are responsible for your actions, it does not support the
traditional assumption that this is because you have a conscious free will. This would require the
identification of your conscious self with whatever parts of you end up with the responsibility for
the decision. You may be the loop, but if this is the case, “you” refers to something more than your
consciousness. Dennett does not like boundary lines (1991a: 414; 1995: 200-02; 2003: 127), but he
agrees there are useful, predictive, distinctions between conscious, unconscious and non-conscious
mental content. Consequently, he must also allow that no matter how big he makes the “I” or “you”
or “self”, much of what one does is beyond our direct conscious control, save perhaps, for a
conscious capacity to veto actions we are about to commit.2
In replacing the Cartesian point with an area, the pandemonium model precludes the possibility of
conscious free will, conceived in the traditional sense of a conscious mental state whose content
determines an act. On Dennett’s model the selection process affords no stable position from which a
point-like conscious will could establish a central command. Content that wins the selection process
becomes conscious because, for Dennett, determining action is what makes content conscious. As a
result, consciousness is pushed from the “inner” area of selection towards the realm of action. In
this new location, outside the selection space, there is no room to fit a causal link between a
conscious act and the conscious willing of it, for the two are really one and the same event. Yet
despite removing it from the driver’s seat, Dennett insists consciousness plays a sufficient role in
determining our changing personal natures, our selves, to justify continued talk of “conscious free
will”. Ultimately though, it is on this “self”, and not any robust conception of a conscious will, that
Dennett places the burden of moral responsibility.
By being linguistically conscious of both our past decisions and the probable consequences of
courses of action we think we could take, humans became much better than other animals at making
dangers evitable (at least in the short term). Our consciousness of what we do makes us better able
to change our natures. It permits self-improvement. As beings that can “reflect on what we see and
draw inferences about what we wish to see… we are much more readily redesigned… than any
other organism” (2003: 277). It is, he says, in virtue of being conscious that “I, the larger
temporally and spatially extended self can control, to some degree, what goes on inside… where the
decision-making happens” (2003: 253; Cf. 1991a: 195-99). In the main, the mind does this by
generating stories, couched in the intentional stance, about who we are and why we do what we do.
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These are stories that we tell to ourselves, and others, about how our beliefs and desires lead to our
actions. Typically the stories involve implicit reference to one’s conscious will by way of explicit
reference to oneself. We explain our acts by saying things like “after thinking about it, I decided to
do X because I believed Y and felt that Z was the best that could be achieved under the
circumstances”. The assumption that “I” can decide presupposes a belief in a conscious will, or
something like it. It is in virtue of such assumptions that Dennett feels able to endorse Wegner’s
claim that “Illusory or not, conscious will is the person’s guide to his or her own moral
responsibility for action” (2002: 341 in Dennett 2003: 253).
Two caveats are worth noting. First, as this passage from Wegner indicates, our belief that we have
a conscious will can serve as a guide to moral responsibility, even if the belief is false. The belief
alone suffices to warrant the attribution of the responsibility to the self, though, of course, the
corollary is that learning that the belief is false can undermine the claim. Secondly, something can
serve as a guide even if this something bears no causal role in determining the structure of what it is
a guide to. There is nothing to prevent the belief in a conscious will serving as our guide to moral
responsibility in the event that, as Dennett would have it, free will does exist, though it is not the
sort of creature that could determine the course of our actions.
Dennett does not actually ever tell us what, post reduction, our possession of conscious free will
amounts to. Instead, we are told what it is not, and we hear a lot about the implications of the self’s
ability to change, as this ensures we have no fixed personal nature. Thus, we read, “my view is that
free will is real indeed, but just probably not quite what you thought it was” (2003: 223, Cf. 21,
297) without then being given an explicit positive account. Instead, we are left with the impression
that the claim we enjoy a free will really amounts the assertion that the self can play a role in
determining future action. Because they are conscious, the stories we tell ourselves about why we
do what we do can guide further reflection by setting some of the conditions for further (non-
conscious) selection of mental content. Such conscious accounts of why we did what we did are, for
Dennett, what the self is made of. As such, the self is “a system that is given responsibility, over
time, so that it can reliably be there to take responsibility, ... when questions of accountability
arise” (2003: 287). The conscious self is our vantage point for considering our actions and therefore
where we take responsibility for them. Dennett’s core claim is thus that we are morally responsible
for our actions - despite their being fully determined by past events and non-conscious mental
processes - because their conscious consideration, in light of how we see our self, influences the
circumstances under which bits of content will compete in the future, and thus help to determine
what we ultimately do.
Dennett admits “many people find it hard to grasp this idea or take it seriously. It seems to them to
be a trick with mirrors, some kind of verbal sleight of hand that whisks consciousness, and the real
self, out of the picture just when it was about to be introduced” (2003: 253). Any sense his readers
have of being tricked is, we are frequently told, a consequence of their adherence to “outdated”
Cartesian intuitions about the mind and ontology. Certainly, Cartesian intuitions remain deeply
influential, despite the best efforts of Dennett, and what now seems to be the majority of other
philosophers of mind. But any difficulty we find in accepting that we have free will, despite the
evidence that Wegner and other cognitive scientists (e.g. William Calvin, Walter Freedman, Michael
Gazzaniga, Benjamin Libet, or Vilayanur Ramachandran) have adduced to the contrary, cannot be
wholly blamed on Descartes. As we learn more about the physical and computational mechanisms
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that underlie our decisions we find it ever easier to take a God’s eye view towards them, and thus
find it increasingly difficult to simultaneously suppose that we are consciously responsible for
making our decisions. If Dennett’s free will exists only when we look for it from the intentional
stance, and take the agent’s or self’s perspective, we may indeed have grounds to complain of a
trick.
To head off the complaint, Dennett could show us how the agent perspective relates to the God’s
eye perspective and explain why the latter does not always trump the former. He could argue that
God’s eye reductive explanations of traits found at the agent level manage to retain what is
important about the traits when seen from the agent perspective. Dennett generally does not opt for
such strategies because he holds that some properties can only be identified when one takes a
certain stance towards them. As noted, he suggests trying to identify a property simultaneously
from two perspectives can lead to confusion (2003: 93) rather than understanding. But while it is
reasonable to claim certain properties are only identifiable under a given explanatory framework, it
is also reasonable to remain unsatisfied by explanations that depend on us hopping back and forth
between two explanatory frameworks that we are entirely unable to relate. Still, Dennett may have
good reason for not wanting to try to relate the frameworks, as the god’s eye view is nomic, and the
agent eye view is normative. Why try to bridge the is/ought divide if there is any way of avoiding
the attempt, since so many prior efforts have ended in failure?
This is not to say that Dennett is averse to the naturalization of ethics. On the contrary, in both
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995) as well as the text under review here Dennett provide us with
detailed accounts of how competition and co-operation between non-conscious agents acting
according to simple rules can result in behavior that, from the intentional stance, is normative. Both
books also attempt to explain how this behavior gets ramped up into full-blown moral responsibility
with the arrival of human beings. However, as these efforts at naturalization depend on his quasi-
positivist assumptions about what makes a property real, as well as the epistemic shift to the
intentional stance, Dennett never seriously tries to show how the two explanatory frameworks
relate. If he is right about what makes something real, no such effort is required as each stance is
grounded separately and without priority by their independent predictive success. The end result is
not the usual sort of naturalization proposed by physicalists, but it is no trick either, so long
Dennett continues to remind us that all depends on the plausibility of his initial ontological and
epistemic assumptions.
The limits of the resulting naturalization are particularly apparent in Dennett’s use of what he calls
“free-floating rationales”. Free-floating rationales are conceived as normative properties associated
with the simplest of evolved agents but ultimately sufficiently diverse in content to provide the
basis for human morality. They are free-floating in the sense that they are not moored by
representations. Dennett begins his most explicit definition of the concept by challenging his
readers to describe the activities of gene groups without taking the intentional stance. He then notes
that:
The slow-motion patterns that are predictive at the gene level are remarkably reminiscent
of – actually previews of – the patterns that are predictive at the psychological and social
level: opportunities, discernments and ignorance, seeking out the best moves against the
competition, avoidance and retaliation, choice and risk. The moves and countermoves in
evolutionary R&D have rationales even if nothing and no one explicitly considers them.
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These are what I call free-floating rationales, and they precede our articulated,
considered rationales by billons of years. Among them is the fundamental principle of
the avoidance of harm, … (2003:154, italics original).
Free-floating rationales thus appear as a potential source for the normativity required for a system to
be an agent.3 They look like the sort of property that might be used to explain how genes came to
have the interests that Dennett attributes to them (1995: 328). Unfortunately, none of this is made
clear. Indeed, on a close reading, it turns out that free-floating rationales are not the sorts of
property that, in themselves, can give an agent reasons for doing what it does.
Dennett’s wording suggests it is not the agent or its actions that possess rationales, but the design
of the functional mechanisms that enable the actions. When he first introduces the phrase, Dennett
describes eukaryotic cells as having “no appreciation of the free-floating rationale for their
advantage over their [prokaryotic] competition” (2003: 145). Later, he tells us free-floating
rationales are “…rationales of the designs evolution discovers and endorses” (2003: 185) and that
evolution’s “design decisions” have rationales (2003: 214). Strictly speaking, free-floating rationales
appear to be relational properties of evolutionary advances, of changes in functional designs that
provide selective advantages, rather than properties of the genes or organisms responsible for
reproducing the designs or pressing the advantages. Yet, as it remains much easier to think of gene
groups or organisms seeking to avoid harm than it is to think of design moves doing so, readers
may be forgiven for wondering if Dennett has failed to fill in some crucial gaps in his argument.
Moreover, these lacuna appear at the very base of his effort to show that despite the picture that
emerges when we take the God’s-eye view, we really do have a kind of free-will that suffices for
moral responsibility. Unless we are willing to conflate the function of a protein, the advantage it
provides, and the physical system for reproducing it, free-floating rationales do not, on their own,
seem to supply the normativity needed to transform systems into agents. They thus cannot, at least
as they stand, be used to bridge the gap between the systems we see from the God’s eye view and
the agent’s we see when we take up the intentional stance. Given his claim that genes have interests
and given his efforts, in both Freedom Evolves and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, to contribute to the
naturalization of ethics the reader is left wondering whether, were it not for his positivist
inclinations, free-floating rationales could have grounded the agent-centered view in something
more than the independent predictive advantage of the intentional stance. Could, for example, the
normativity of free-floating rationales be the source for normative properties attributed to non-
human agents when we take the intentional stance?
Whatever their precise relation to non-human agents, Dennett traces the “birth of ethics” and the
origin of moral responsibly to our appropriation of free-floating rationales. We are guided not by
free-floating rationales of survival, but their evolutionary descendants – rationales captured by our
power to linguistically represent them and subject them to internal and social debate.
Once we have captured the free-floating rationales of the natural motives and represented
them… we are no longer bound by the inefficient, wasteful, mindless trial and error of
natural selection. We can hope to replace an equilibrium of sheer replicative power with
a reflected equilibrium of rational agents who have engaged in the communal activity of
mutual persuasion” (2003: 267).
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We are unlike other animals in that the desires bequeathed to us by our genes are not all we have to
go on. Our desires are also culturally derived, but most important of all, whatever their external
origin, the desires and values of adults are considered and vetted by conscious selves. Hume’s finger
notwithstanding, reflection on our values allows for their prioritization and on occasion, revaluation.
It is this freedom that allows us to make the values we grow up with our own, and thus take
responsibility for them.
Your practical judgments are governed by your beliefs about your circumstances, how you might be
able to affect them, and a set of goals or values that determine what outcomes you want to achieve.
As Dennett argues at length (1995: 324-31, 467-93; 2003: 169-219), while there is ample evidence
that some of our most basic values remain deeply genetically entrenched, cultural forces can
attenuate, combat, redirect, exploit and subvert these tendencies (1995: 472). This interplay of
genetic and cultural influences ensure that almost all children develop some sort of value hierarchy.
But children can bear little responsibility for these values, as the two sets of forces shaping their
ethical mores are historically contingent and entirely beyond their control. To become responsible
one must have the opportunity to reflect on the values that one learns as a child, so as to make them
your own. Those who through indoctrination or abuse may, like some abducted child soldiers, be
said to have lacked such opportunity may not be morally responsible for their behavior. Their
actions, they may claim, were not really their own. In so far as this conscious reflection is
understood by those engaged in it to be carried out by their conscious self, it is the self that, as
Dennett says, takes the responsibility for the actions taken. The real question, however, is whether
the self is justified making this claim, given that it is at least not directly causally responsible for
the content of the conclusions reached through reflection.
So we return, again, to the question of whether decisions determined by non-conscious mental
processes can, by being attributed to our conscious self, warrant moral responsibility. How can
something that is not primarily causally responsible for an act be morally responsible for it? The
case is made even more difficult when we remember what Dennett takes the self to be. It is, he tells
us, akin to your PC’s graphical user interface. The self is “the brain’s user illusion” (2003: 253;
1991a: 412-18), a fiction of self-representation that evolved to aid social interaction. Still, if this
self-representation feeds back some of its results to the non-conscious mind, future decision making
could be influenced. Choices about what means to apply in a given situation could be modified as a
result, and goals determining what should be attempted could be altered. All such changes may
have been pre-determined from the moment of the big bang, but Dennett is right to argue that a
fixed personal future is compatible with our having a malleable personal nature. Indeed, making
normal human decisions almost certainly requires a self that reflects on your past, learns from it,
and in so doing changes itself. This is a worthwhile freedom, though it is far from the freedom we
thought we had. I, however, am not yet convinced it is all the freedom we should want.
If the Dennett-Wegner account of decision-making is correct, which of their rhetorical strategies is
less misleading? Since the outcome of the non-conscious competition between bits of content are
actions that we feel we have freely and consciously chosen, and since there is no other way for us
to make “conscious” decisions, Dennett argues that we are best off describing our decisions as the
manifestation of a conscious free will. He takes his varieties of free will to be worth wanting “…
because they play all the valuable roles free will has been traditionally invoked to play” (2003:
225). As for the “non-valuable” roles traditionally attributed to free will but lacking in Dennett’s
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/maxwellrev.html[9/18/2009 5:08:52 PM]
account, since they make no difference to our behaviour, they, like the phenomenology of
consciousness, can be comfortably ignored by those who agree with Dennett that epistemology
determines ontology. Dennett has built his career arguing against the existence of such intrinsic,
epiphenomenal mental properties. A book that ties together arguments and conclusions from most of
his preceding work is an unlikely place stop. Indeed, the credibility of the conceptual stretch
required to call the result of Dennett’s reduction “free will” turns on the success of his previous
explanations of intentionality and consciousness. If you think these explanations work, and if you
think the ontological scruples that underlie them are appropriate, Dennett’s strategy won’t seem to
be a trick. If you have serious doubts about Dennettian realism you are either likely side with
Wegner and conclude that conscious will is an illusion or find yourself musing about whether the
scientific evidence that appears to support this view really speaks to the issue.
Shaun Maxwell
Independent Scholar
Notes
1. This can help to explain some of the phenomenology of the will, as in cases where we find our
will to be weak and seek to explain our difficulty by speaking of a divided self (Cf. Davidson
1970/2001).
2. Many of the neuroscientists Dennett discusses agree that this veto power is the most free will that
the current evidence allows for (2003: 230-31). Unfortunately for Dennett the easiest way to explain
such a power is by positing some sort of gate-keeper over outgoing signals. Such a system would
not amount to the “central-meaner” of the Cartisian theatre but it would require a reconfiguring of
Dennett’s proposed mental architecture.
3. Agents are systems that do things, rather than merely react to what is done to them.
Consequently, they can make mistakes. As Dennett put it in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea “right from
the beginning, the cost of doing something is running the risk of doing it wrong, of making a
mistake” (1995: 203). Agency is thus an essentially normative concept.
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